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THE FUNCTIONS OF THE RIGHT TO DEVELORvENT:
.A RIGHT TO SELF-REALIZATION
Alain Pellet
In some respect, lawyers are like stylish beautiful ladies: they
follow the latest modes and there can be no doubt that the concept of the
"right to development" is "in fashion".
The concept of a "right to development" which as recently as a decade
ago had yet to become current,1 is now one of the ideas most debated
among international lawyers.2 After an uncertain start the doctrine
has been quickly consolidated; in the words of Philip Alston it has
acquired an "almost impeccable pedigree".3
After a hesitant launching in 1066 by the Senegalese representative
at the U.N. General Assembly and after a well-known religious period
(marked by the Algiers Cardinal Duval's speech in 1969), a reference to
the concept of the right to development has become obligatory in
political speeches during North-South meetings.4 The accelerating
process of consolidation has been remarkable. Already the right to
development has been the subject of dozens of papers, studies or
reports,5 of at least one academic dissertation6 and of some
important international conferences.
Generally speaking, studies on the right to development have a
three-fold purpose:
(i) they try to establish the juridical existence,
(or non-existence) of the right - its positivity;
(ii) they aim at classifying the right to development
in well-established classifications;
(iii) they seek to define its content; (the answer to
this last question conditions to a large extent
the answers to the other two questions).
But, as a rule, instead cf giving a general definition of the whole
expression "Right to Development", these studies put the emphasis on the
word "Development" and neglect the terms "Right to .... ". Development
is:
- a multidimensional notion,
- an evolving or shifting ccncept,
- and an unsettled, or relative idea, vary.ing according to the
different societies to which it applies.
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Therefore, as there is little hope of an agreed definition of
development, at least in juridical terms, it appears that it could be
less presumptuous, at least for a lawyer, not to try to define the word
"development" but rather the concept of the right to development as a
whole. The modest purpose of this short study is, therefore, to essay a
tentative definition of the latter through the functions it performs or
could perform.
The right to development seems to mark (and render concrete) the'
conjunction of concepts already in existence; it is a "crossroads
right". But the right to development is also the starting point of new
juridical and, very likely, political developments. From this vantage
point it may be viewed as a "foundation right".
"A CROSSROADS RIGHT"
Many authors who have studied the right to development assert that it
is a synthesis of already existing rights. Whilst this might be true
there exists considerable ambiguity in the use of the term "synthesis".
On the other hand, there can be no doubt at all that the right to
development marks the intersection between two important juridical
"highways": Human Rights on the one hand and the international Law of
Development on the other.
Is the Right to Development a "Synthesis" of already existin rights?
Many writers seem to share the view that the right to development is
made up of pre-existing rights. From this standpoint the right seems to
be merely a bundle of numerous human rights plus the juridical rules
devised to advance the interests of the peripheral countries, familiarly
known as the international law of development. For example, tMadame Rojas
defines the content of the right to development by re-ordering a great
many existing rights under the following headings:
(1) those fulfilling basic needs and economic and
social rights.
(2) those fulfilling non-material needs and civil
and political rights. An example of the
former would be the sharing of incomes and
resources and of the latter
self-determination. 7
In large part, the Working Group of Governmental Experts on the Right
to Development, which was appointed in 1931 by the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights, first adopted this kind of approach, as is evident from a
reading of the very provisional draft declaration annexed to the report
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of the Working Group at its fifth session.8 This text, however,
reflects a more sophisticated categorisation of rights.9
If the concept of the right to development is nothing but an
-accumulation of already existing rights, it is not very convincing and
one can wonder whether it is really worthwhile spending so much time in
discussing such a poor and disappointing idea. One would be forced to
concur with two eminent pioneer writers, Judge Keba M'Baye and Professor
Jean Rivero, who, for completely different reasons, were of the opinion
that it was totally useless and futile to proclaim the right to
development in a new formal instrument.10 In the same spirit, a French
author, Professor Jean-Jaques Israel, writes in a recent study "Sous
couvert de crier un nouveau droit, (on cr&e) en r~alite un jsque de
d'valoriser ceux qui existent et sont pleinement reconnus".11
I
But a "synthesis" is not necessarily a mere addition and it is
significant that several authors who define the right to development as a
synthesis insist that synthesis implies an aggregation of rights.
The right to development takes its roots in the different rights
which contribute to development and its autonomy is gaining recognition.
Thus Theo Van Boven correctly sees the right to development as a whole
range of existing human rights which are informed and given an extra
dimension by the emergence of a growing international consensus on a
variety of development objectives."12 As Philip Alston put it: "A
synthetic approach helps to emphasize the dynamism of existing
rights."13
The right to development is the outcome of a mixing of two different
juridical streams - human rights on the one hand, and the international
law of development on the other; the right therefore marks the confluence
of these two streams.
A Confluence Point
It has often been remarked that the international approach to human
rights on one hand and development objectives on the other has been
separate but parallel for some considerable time. It is true that in the
U.N. Charter both problems are closely related. Both Article 1(3) and
the very important Article 55 link international co-operation in the
economic, social and cultural fields and the implementation of human
rights. Other international texts take the same approach, for example
Article 22 and 28 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, paragraph
3 of the Preamble to the Human Rights Covenants of 1966 and paragraphs 12
and 13 of the Teheran Declaration of 1968. Nevertheless, for a long
time- this proximity was purely formal and had few practical
consequences. The U.N. 4-jman Rights machinery has grown up in a way
largely independent of the "development machine". The gap between the
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two concepts may be traced in part to the ultra-specialization of
scholars who deal exclusively with human rights issues.14
A second point may be stressed in this respect: generally speaking,
when the relationship between the two notions was recognised, it was
regarded as "one-way only". Development was sometimes seen as a
pre-requisite for the respect of human rights but it was much rarer for
human rights to be regarded as a condition or an element in development.
It is noticeable that the few texts which mentioned the relationship
between these two fields, human rights and development, were mainly human
rights texts, whereas the great texts on development do not pay any
attention to human rights problems. The reason, no doubt, was that the
development texts emanated from the third world and that third world
countries were suspicious of "western-oriented" human rights doctrines.
However, this situation has now changed. The reason cannot be
explored here,15 but the evolution parallels that of the "ideology of
development" in the U.N. Initially, development was seen as a purely
quantitative notion, as is well illustrated by the Rostow's famous theory
of the "take-off". An early recognition of the inadequacy of this theory
may be found in the proclamation of the concept of "integrated economic
and social development" in the Declaration on Social Progress and
Development.16 But one must wait right until the end of the 1970's to
see the emergence of a truly new approach which Clarence Dias termed
"human development", so as to include human rights in development and
development in human rights.17
This process has been made possible by a conjunction of various
factors, among which the changes in the ccmposition of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights must not be underestimated. It has been made
easier by the elaboration of the doctrines of the New International
Economic Order which is founded upon ideas of justice and equity.
The right to development has been asserted in U.N. fora in a logical
sequence: firstly by the Commission on Human Rights, with the adoption of
the resolution 4 (XXXIII) in February 1977; secondly, by the Economic and
Social Council three months later; finally in 1979, by the General
Assembly's resolution 34/46 which underlined that "the right to
development is a human right and that equality of opportunity for
development is as much a prerogative of nations as of individuals within
nations". Such important texts adopted recently in the development field
are undoubtedly much more "human rights oriented" than their
predecessors. The corparison between the first and the second U.N.
Development Strategies is very enlightening from this point of view.
Thus, the right to development provides a bridge between two fundamental
elements of global ideology by emphasising the human purpose of
development: to paraphrase Jean-Paul Sartre's famous formula,
"development is humanism". As Dupuy has put it, the concept of a New
International Economic Order "cannot be validly defined unless its
foundation rests on three pillars of justice: peace, without which
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development is impossible, development, without which human rights are
illusory, and human rights, without which peace is violence."1 8
There is an inherent danger in an approach which emphasises the
interdependence of all human rights,19 - a tendency to place too much
emphasis on the fact that development and the achievement of a New
International Economic Order are pre-requisites for a real implementation
of human rights while overlooking the idea that respect for human rights
is an integral part of development. Such a tendency could lead to the
creation of a hierarchy of human rights, wrongly placing economic and
social rights in a "higher" category than civil and political rights.
A careful reading of some of the recent resolutions of the U.N.
General Assembly, such as Resolution 32/130 adopted in 1977, shows that
misgivings at such a tendency may have some justification. However, at
its thirty-seventh session, the General Assembly seems to have "adjusted
its range-finder": resolution 37/199 emphasises that "the U.N. should
give attention not only to the human rights aspects of development but
also to the developmental aspects of human rights" and resolution 37/200,
which, unfortunately, was opposed by socialist states and a number of
developing countries, recognizes that "the realization of the
potentialities of the human person in harmony with the community should
be seen as the central purpose of development". Thus the value of the
concept of the right to development lies in its position at the
confluenCe of two streams of equal strength - human rights and
development.
"A FOUNDATION RIGHT"
The right to development is not only a "crossroad right", it is also
a "foundation right", from a twofold perspective. On the one hand, it
provides a retrospective explanation of a number of pre-existing rights,
and, on the other hand, it bears the promise of new and probably rich
extensions of rights.
A Retrospective Explanation
International life and international law do not always grow according
to harmonious and logical plans and logical concepts often only
crystallise after the emergence of the various elements they embody or
from which they arise. As in Le bourgeois gentilhomme by Moli&re, where
M. Jourdain speaks prose without being aware of it, similarly jurists
apply a large number of rules of law without knowing - or trying to
discover - the general principle which explains and justifies them.
This is true of the right to development: a great many rules of law
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cannot be understood if the right to development does not exist, but
those rules have been formulated before the recognition of the still
incompletely articulated "mother" concept of the right to development.
How could one explain the right to health, or to decent conditions of
living, or-the right of states and peoples to take part in world trade,
or even the right of developing countries to receive international aid,
without referring to the concept of the right to development, as
belonging to individuals as well as to collectivities?
It thus appears that two nice juridical problems are quite
irrelevant, namely
() Is the right to development an individual or
a collective right?
(ii) Is it a positive juridical principle or a de
leqe ferenda rule?
As to the first question, it is enough to say that the right to
development does indeed constitute the foundation of individual rights as
well as of collective rights and these derived rights can belong as much
to human beings alone as to human being in groups, to human
collectivities like states, peoples or certain states and certain
peoples.20
The second question does not seem any more relevant. Some writers
assert that the right to development is not yet a legal principle or is,
at least, "ineffective".21 One cannot share these doubts; if one can
accept the idea that the right to development is the foundation of many
other unquestioned rights, this is the very proof that it is a positive
juridical principle. This does not however mean that all possible
consequences have been drawn from that status.
A Startinq Point
It is clear that, as of now, neither all the regulations necessary to
make the principle workable have been enacted, nor that all the lcgical
consequences of the recognition of the concept of the right to
development have been pursued. As Judge Roberto Ago said during the
colloquium held in The Hague in 1979, English is more precise than
French, as it makes a distinction between "law" and "right", while both
ideas are designated by the French word "droit".22 As far as the right
to development is concerned, one may consider that the unintentional
ambiguity in the French usage conforms better with the uncertainty of the
present state of law.
For the present, the right to development is a part of positive
international law. It may be doubtful or, at least it is debatable,
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whether the right can be regarded as a positive "right". To transpose it
in the French juridical language, it seems that the right to development
is, here and now, a "droit objectif", while it is not as well established
that it is a 'droit subjectif".
Put another way its holders can only call for the enforcement of
those particular consequential obligations that have been already
accepted by individual ..states and by the international community. These
precise obligations are much more often obligations to adopt a certain
behaviour ("obligations de comportement") than obligations to reach a
definite result ("obliqations de resultat").23
Going from the law to the right, that is from duties as to conduct to
obligations to produce results, could prove one of the main areas for
future work in this field, and a task which the Working Group of the
Commission on Human Rights could most usefully perform. But this
deepening and materialization of the idea is possible only if it is
further recognized that the right to development is an autonomous concept
and not only the mere aggregation of already existing rights. 2 4
In this respect one must agree with those authors, like Karel de Vey
Mestdagh who underline the "instrumental" nature of the right to
development.25 To give another instance, Professor Rivero's views,
although cautiously expressed are quite acceptable when he defines the
right to development as "l'ensemble des moyens qui permettront de rendre
effectifs les droit 6conomiques et sociaux pour la masse des hommes qui
en sont douloureusement privs". 2 6 Yet, this is not enough: the scope
of the right to development is not limited to economic and social
rights. In a more comprehensive way, it appears as the right which
belongs to every human being and to every human collectivity namely that
the conditions should be created whereby each may endeavour to enjoy
economic, social and cultural rights, as well as civil and political
rights. As much is stated in the resolution 36 (XXXVII) of the U.N.
Commission on Hbman Rights. It is a right to the concretisaticn of
proclaimed rights or, to put it in a nurshell, it is a right to the means
of self-realisation.
It may look paradoxical to proclaim in an abstract manner a right
whose main function is to insure the concrete implementation of other
rights. It is by no means certain that such a proclamation will change,
by itself, the actual state of things. Nevertheless, the solemn adoption
of a right to development by a significant number of members of the U.N.
from all parts of the world will be very valuable.
The proclamation of the right will
(i) guide theoretical deliberations towards an
holistic discussion, giving thereby full
meaning to the idea that a "synthesis" is
not the mere addition of its composing
element s;
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(ii) confirm the inter-relationship between human
rights and development, on an equal and
balanced basis;
(iii) reinforce pre-existing rights by making
their foundation obvious;
(iv) encourage new negotiations to draw logical
and practical consequences from the newly
declared right.
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